"Gross" is a subjective term which brings about varied interpretation. Misconduct may be regarded as more broad for RRS 2017-2020, although if you consider the language of 69.2(g) with respect to "standard of proof", along with "comfortable satisfaction", this serves to temper misconduct. A lengthy briefing by Dr. Chris Davies titled, "The 'Comfortable Satisfaction' Standard of Proof: Applied by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Drug-Related Cases", can be accessed on the internet. "Standard of proof" language existed in RRS 2013-2016 69.2(c), with "comfortable satisfaction" appearing in the rewrite of RRS 69 for the new quadrennial.

Clifford, thanks for your comment. I understand the objection to "gross," but it does have a meaning, which is "serious," "significant" or "egregious." So my question is, "Does the new "simple misconduct" standard mean you can lodge a report for "misconduct" like putting your elbows on the table at the event dinner or parking in the commodore's parking space? IMO, the plain meaning of the rule says "yes' to both of these questions, although I think virtually everyone would agree that these offenses do not warrant a penalty under rule 69 (although the second could warrant banishment of an offender's vehicle from the event venue.)

IMO, the "comfortable satisfaction" standard applies to whether or not an alleged incident actually occurred, and possibly to the appropriateness/ severity of the penalty, rather than the question of what kinds of misconduct are punishable under the rule. My question about the standard is whether more proof is required when the offense is more egregious, or less proof is required when the penalty will be light. I believe that this deliberately introduces an element of variability that is likely to undermine the authority of the rules. My personal opinion is that the committee should be "more sure" that an offense occurred when a penalty would be warranted or when the resulting penalty will be more severe, but the descriptive language in the rule and the judges manual seems very confused and ambiguous on that issue.

We may defer to Case 122